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Executive summary
Since the beginning of the Syrian uprising in mid-March 2011, the United Arab Emirates has 
adopted a relatively ambiguous position regarding events in the country, officially supporting the 
Syrian opposition but maintaining various links with the Assad regime in Damascus. In 2015, the 
UAE began withdrawing from the Syrian conflict, investing its attention and resources increasingly in 
the war in Yemen. However, by 2018 the UAE was pursuing a rapprochement with the Syrian regime, 
re-opening its embassy in Damascus in December of that year. The ostensible purpose of this – to 
counter the deepening influence of Turkey and Iran in Syria – appears misguided in several respects. 
On the economic front, there are potential opportunities for Emirati investment in various sectors 
in Syria, such as real estate, transport and trade. These sectors were all traditional beneficiaries of 
Emirati investment prior to 2011. The prospective return of UAE investment to Syria, however, is 
fraught with complications and obstacles in the short and medium terms, particularly in the light of 
US sanctions and economic difficulties in Dubai. 
The potential for Syrian business people in the UAE to act as intermediaries for Emirati investors is 
somewhat limited. The vast majority of these people have little prospect of returning to the country, 
at least in the short term, as they would face difficulties and obstacles represented by the regime’s 
business networks, which have consolidated their grip on the Syrian economy. Instead, business 
networks already close to the regime are currently those best positioned to play this intermediate role 
for Emirati investment. 
2
Introduction
In late December 2018, the UAE reopened its embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus, seven 
years after its closure. Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, the UAE Foreign Minister, later declared the 
step would help ensure that Syria recovered its place in the Arab world.1 The reopening, which 
was followed by numerous bilateral visits by Emirati businessmen and officials to Syria and by a 
Syrian delegation to the UAE in January 2019, raised many questions in the media and in European 
diplomatic circles about the meaning and impact of what was presented as a change in UAE policy. 
Abu Dhabi, the most powerful emirate among the seven that make up the UAE, is the main driver of 
the country’s foreign policy. By contrast, Dubai, whose influence stems primarily from its role as an 
economic and trading hub in non-oil sectors, has seen its political clout reduced since the financial 
crisis of 2008-2009.2
Many analysts have argued that the reopening of the embassy could have major consequences for the 
re-legitimisation of the Syrian regime within the Arab world and the wider international community.3 
Moreover, the potential return of Emirati economic investment to Syria has been the subject of much 
speculation. Reconstruction in Syria is today one of the most widely debated issues in academic 
and policy-making circles,4 and the potential sources of foreign financing to fund it remain highly 
uncertain. In this context, it is crucial to understand the possible role the UAE might play in Syria. 
This study first looks at the fluctuating relations between the UAE and Syria since 2011, to help 
understand the UAE’s possible incentives for investing in Syria. With its economic power and 
dynamic private sector, the UAE could effectively participate with much-needed capital in the 
massive reconstruction effort that Syria requires. As of December 2018, the UAE’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) was reported to be 414 billion USD, making it the region’s second largest economy 
after Saudi Arabia. This paper investigates the geostrategic and economic incentives and obstacles 
involved in Emirati reinvestment in Syria, the sectors likely to be targeted by Emirati businessmen 
and the networks and channels through which the UAE could (re-)invest in the country. The study 
makes extensive use of media reports, newspaper articles and interviews and informal discussions 
conducted with Syrian businessmen. 
1  Mina Aldroubi, “Syria Should Recover its Place in the Arab World, Says UAE Minister,” The National, 6 March 2019, 
https://bit.ly/2Hgkxgl  
2  Matthias Sailer, “UAE Foreign Policy and the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Hardly a Ruler in Waiting,” Qantara, 26 
March 2018, https://bit.ly/2ZwU58A  
3  Giorgio Cafiero, “Can Arab Gulf States Neutralize Iranian Influence in Syria?” Inside Arabia, 11 March 2019, https://bit.
ly/2HyzFYi; Michael Young, “As Arab States Normalize With Syria, Will This Push Them to Finance its Reconstruction?” 
Carnegie Middle East Center, 24 January 2019, https://bit.ly/2DxcIRT; Imad K. Harb, “The Trickiness of Syria’s Return 
to the Arab League,” Arab Center Washington DC, 29 March 2019, https://bit.ly/2mWWXO6 
4  Erwin Van Veen, “The Geopolitics of Syria’s Reconstruction: a Case of Matryoshka,” CRU Policy Brief (The Hague: 
Clingendael, April 2019), https://bit.ly/2lZlTV6; Eugenio Dacrema and Valeria Talbot, “Rebuilding Syria: The Middle 
East’s Next Power Game?” ISPI Report (Milan: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), 20 September 
2019), https://bit.ly/2Mifn4W; Maen Tallaa et al., Economic Recovery in Syria: Mapping Actors and Assessing Current 
Policies, (Istanbul: Omran for Strategic Studies, 2019), http://bit.ly/2lHvGit; Steven Heydemann, “Beyond Fragility: 
Syria and the Challenges of Reconstruction in Fierce States,” Report (Washington: Foreign Policy at Brookings, 
June 2018), https://brook.gs/2TJGSam; Joseph Daher, “The Political Economic Context of Syria’s Reconstruction: a 
Prospective in Light of a Legacy of Unequal Development,” Research Project Report (Florence: European University 
Institute, December 2018), https://bit.ly/2GGRYbs  
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1. Syria and the UAE: an Ambiguous Relationship
Before the 2011 uprising, many Gulf monarchies, including the UAE, enjoyed relatively positive 
relations with Damascus. After a period of high tension, especially following the assassination of the 
Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafic Hariri, in 2005, relations calmed down and normalised after the Doha 
Agreement of May 2008.5 This translated into increasing levels of investment by Gulf monarchies in 
Syria in the late 2000s.  
1.1. Supporting the Syrian Opposition, but Maintaining Ties with the Regime
In the early stages of the Syrian uprising, Gulf rulers tried to engage with the regime to facilitate 
a peaceful solution to the protests,6 preferring not to see Assad ousted from power. The UAE and 
Saudi Arabia were especially worried about the regional trend of uprisings, while Qatar wished to 
maintain its good relations with Damascus, which had been a close ally prior to 2011.7 
However, after the Saudi Arabian King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud condemned Bashar al-
Assad’s “killing machine” and called for a stop to the bloodshed in August 2011,8 the UAE joined its 
counterparts in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to denounce the Syrian regime’s actions against 
protesters at the end of summer 2011. Along with the five other members of the GCC, the UAE 
eventually closed its embassy in March 2012, declaring support for the “legitimate aspirations of the 
Syrian people to restore security and stability to the country” on various occasions in the following 
years.9
The UAE became a member of the international coalition of states opposed to the Damascus regime 
known as the ‘Friends of Syria’ at its first meeting in Tunis in February 2012. In 2013, the UAE was one 
of the ‘London 11’ states which met the opposition’s Syrian National Coalition in the British capital.10 
Within Syria’s political and armed opposition bodies, the Emirates has always supported personalities 
and groups opposed to, or not supportive of, the policies of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). For 
example, in July 2013 it backed the newly-elected president of the Syrian National Coalition, Ahmad 
Jarba, a tribal leader from the Shammar clan in the north-eastern Syrian province of Hasakah, well-
known for its close links with Saudi Arabia. In 2016, the UAE and Egypt continued to support Jarba, 
who launched a new opposition movement in Cairo called ‘Syria’s Tomorrow’ (al-Ghad al-Suri). 
Although its role was less prominent than those of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey, the UAE also 
backed armed opposition groups, mainly between 2012 and 2018. These were mostly non-Islamist 
battalions of the Free Syrian Army, vetted to ensure they were anti-Brotherhood and anti-jihadist. 
Emirati support for the groups was provided through programmes run by the US Central Intelligence 
5  The Doha agreement cleared the way for the presidential election and the formation of a government of National Unity 
in Lebanon in November 2009. Bilal Y. Saab, “Syria Seeks Change: On Its Own Terms,” Brookings, 17 November 2008, 
https://brook.gs/2VaoSHC. After this, relations between Syria and Saudi Arabia warmed considerably, with the Saudi 
king visiting Damascus and Assad visiting Riyadh three times in 2009 and 2010. 
6  In April 2011, the UAE Foreign Minister met President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus twice and handed over a message 
from Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan, the ruler of the UAE, regarding developments in the region. Syrian Foreign 
Minister Walid al-Moallem paid an official visit to the UAE on 5 June 2011 and met Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-
Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces.
7  Before 2011, Sheikh Hamad of Qatar actually championed the international rehabilitation of Bashar al-Assad against the 
ostracism of Damascus by the United States, Europe and other Arab states.
8  Elisabeth Flock, “Saudi King Abdullah to Syria: ‘Stop the Killing Machine’,” Washington Post, 8 August 2011, https://
wapo.st/33asvA1
9  Gulf News, “UAE Reaffirms Support for Syria,” 25 September 2013, https://bit.ly/2LM0I36 
10  Gov UK, “‘London 11’ Meeting on Syria,” Press release, 22 October 2013, https://bit.ly/2lKPDos 
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Agency, notably in southern Syria through the Military Operations Center  based in Jordan.11 Khaled 
Mahamid, a Syrian businessman based in the Emirates since 2000, was deemed the UAE’s man in 
the Syrian opposition, especially in his hometown of Daraa. Mahamid became the chief intermediary 
providing Emirati funding to armed opposition groups in the Southern Front coalition.12 The Emirates 
also funded Jarba’s militia in the northeast, the Syrian Elite Forces (SEF), which were established 
in May 201613 and fought alongside the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as official members of the 
US-led international coalition fighting Islamic State.14
By late 2011, the Emirates had also started welcoming the activities of Syrian businessmen residing 
in the UAE who were opposed to the Damascus regime. In November 2012, the Dubai Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry organised a ‘Partnership to Invest in Future Syria’ Conference under the 
patronage of the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs15 and with the participation of numerous UAE-
based Syrian businessmen to discuss opportunities to build the Syrian economy in a post-Assad era. 
Syrian businessmen at the conference declared they would invest 1 billion USD in various sectors of 
the Syrian economy (real estate, services, health and education) in the event that the Assad regime 
fell.16 
However, the UAE’s behaviour differed in certain aspects to that of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which 
were leading the regional Arab opposition to Damascus. The UAE never completely abandoned 
the traditional positions it had taken since the beginning of the 2011 uprisings: preventing radical 
change by supporting authoritarian regimes; opposing democratisation; and fighting against Islamic 
fundamentalist and jihadist groups. This was reflected first in its political and economic support, 
worth 4.9 billion USD, for the new Egyptian military-backed government following the army-led 
coup in July 2013 against the Muslim Brotherhood government led by President Mohamed Morsi. 
Regarding Syria, the UAE never entirely cut diplomatic relations with Damascus and the Syrian 
embassy continued to operate in Abu Dhabi. Moreover, the Emirates opened its doors to a number 
of Assad’s close relatives, including his mother, Anisa (who died in the UAE in 2016), and his sister 
Bushra (whose husband, General Assef Shawkat, was killed in a bombing in Damascus in July 2012) 
along with her children. 
Several internationally-sanctioned pro-regime businessmen have also continued to do business 
through local companies with relative freedom in the UAE, including Bashar al-Assad’s first cousin, 
Rami Makhlouf, and Samer Foz. Many other Emirati businessmen known to be close to the UAE 
government also maintained relations with Damascus long after the eruption of Syria’s protest 
movement. Some established new companies in Syria and/or opened branches of their UAE-based 
companies in the country. For example, Abdul Jalil al-Blooki, a businessman close to the ruling 
family in Abu Dhabi, established a development and investment company in Syria in 2013.17
11  International Crisis Group, “Keeping the Calm in Southern Syria,” (Beirut/Amman/Brussels, 21 June 2018), https://
bit.ly/2MLIk8T 
12  The UAE also provided 55,000 food baskets per month in southern Syria, which were distributed to different civil 
society organisations and armed opposition factions. Hiba Mohammad, “Syrian Opponents to al-Quds al-Arabi: Deputy 
Chairman of the ‘High Commission’ behind the Freezing of the Daraa Fronts with UAE Support” (in Arabic),  Al-Quds, 
25 May 2018, https://bit.ly/2pXODiJ 
13  The SEF is primarily composed of two influential Arab tribes in north-eastern and eastern towns in Syria: al-Shu’aytat 
and Shammar.
14  The UAE participated in the US led anti-IS coalition in Syria, which was formed in September 2014. Abdulrahman al-
Masri, “The Decline of the Syrian Elite Forces,” Atlantic Council, 6 September 2017, https://bit.ly/2Mv5YHE   
15  Dubai Chamber, “Dubai Chamber Organizes the ‘Partnership to Invest in Future Syria’ Conference,” 30 October 2012, 
https://bit.ly/2kEN32V 
16  Dubai Chamber, “Partnership to Invest in Future Syria Held in Dubai,” 22 November 2012, https://bit.ly/2lKbJY3 
17  Syrian Days, “Emirates Company for Development and Investment in Syria” (in Arabic), 23 March 2013, https://bit.
ly/35mwyei 
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Many UAE-based individuals and companies also actively aided Assad’s war effort. In 2013, 
Computerlinks FZCO, a distribution company in Dubai, agreed to pay a 2.8 million USD civil penalty 
for shipping embargoed US equipment to the Syrian government to monitor and control internet 
traffic.18 Others provided the Syrian regime with the fuel it needed to operate its war machine.19 In 
addition, Dubai-based Yona Star acted as shipping agent for the Syrian Air Force, Syrian Air Force 
Intelligence, the Army Supply Bureau and the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC), which 
has been developing the regime’s biological and chemical weapon capabilities.20 
Finally, throughout the years of conflict, the UAE maintained a high level of humanitarian assistance 
to Syria through UN agencies based in Damascus working in close coordination with the Syrian 
government.21 UAE foreign assistance to Syria reached 3.59 billion AED (977 million USD) between 
2012 and the beginning of 2019 according to the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation and UAE AID.22 By comparison, the Emirates’ financial assistance to the opposition-
affiliated Syria Reconstruction Trust Fund had amounted to just 23 million USD as of February 2019.23
1.2. Gradual Withdrawal from the Syrian Arena
The implicit willingness of some Gulf monarchies to normalise relations with Damascus became 
explicit in summer 2018. Leading the way were the UAE and Bahrain,24 which both re-reopened 
their embassies in Syria in December 2018. In May 2019, during the month of Ramadan, the UAE 
embassy in Syria distributed food packages bearing the emblem of the Emirates in Marjeh Square in 
central Damascus. It also bankrolled two Syrian soap operas airing exclusively on Abu Dhabi TV.25  
This shift in UAE foreign policy regarding the Syrian conflict has its roots in regional developments 
in 2014 and 2015. First, starting in 2014 in the aftermath of Muammar Gaddafi’s downfall, the UAE 
(re-)intervened in Libya with airstrikes against Islamist-led groups supported by Turkey and Qatar, 
supporting the Libyan National Army forces loyal to Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar.26 Second, it played 
an active role in the Saudi-led war against Yemen which started in March 2015, providing political, 
economic and military support to the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen.27 Having secured its 
18  United States Department of Commerce, “Order Relating to Aiman Ammar, Rashid Albuni, Engineering Construction 
& Contracting Co., Advanced Tech Solutions and iT Wave FZCO,” 2013, https://bit.ly/2z7zn47 
19  In July 2014, Pangates International Corporation was sanctioned for supplying the Syrian government and Sytrol, a 
state-owned oil company, with a large amount of speciality petroleum products between 2012 and 2014. Caline Malek, 
“US Sanctions Sharjah Company for Sales to Syria,” The National, 15 July 2014, https://bit.ly/2nNNitK 
20  US Department of Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Networks Providing Support to the Government of Syria,” 21 July 
2016, https://bit.ly/29YCwrk 
21  Reinoud Leeders and Khouloud Mansour, “Humanitarianism, State Sovereignty and Authoritarian Regime Maintenance 
in the Syrian War,” Political Science Quarterly 133(2), July 2018, 225-257.
22  Emirates News Agency, “UAE Aid to Syria Reaches AED3.59 billion from 2012-2019,” 25 January 2019, 
https://bit.ly/2m96Iby 
23  Syria Recovery Trust Fund, 13 February 2019, https://bit.ly/2BrrdVs
24  Associated Press. “Syria’s Assad Reaches ‘Understanding’ with Arab States,” VOA News, 3 October 2018, 
https://bit.ly/2lQOUlo 
25  Asia Times, “UAE Using Soft Power in Syria After 7-Year Frost,” 31 May 2019, https://bit.ly/31S51Pl 
26  Andrew McGregor, “Egypt, the UAE and Arab Military Intervention in Libya,” Terrorism Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 
17, 5 September 2014, https://bit.ly/2VUT5cO 
27  Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, “The Southern Implosion – The Yemen Review, August 2019,” 4 September 2019, 
https://bit.ly/2MnEGTk  
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interests,28 and facing Western pressure to end the war, the UAE announced a reduction of its military 
presence in Yemen in August 2019, scaling back its efforts against the country’s Houthi militants. 
Finally, the Emirates and Saudi Arabia were the main actors severing political, trade and transport 
ties with Doha in June 2017, accusing Qatar of supporting terrorism, fomenting regional unrest by 
backing movements such as the Brotherhood and Hamas, and getting too close to Iran – all of which 
Doha denied. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi sought above all to curb Qatar’s foreign policy and subordinate 
it to their own regional agendas.
From that time onwards, the UAE’s regional priorities have been the wars in Yemen and Libya, 
rivalry with Qatar and tensions with Iran. From 2015, the UAE decreased its participation in the US-
led anti-IS coalition in Syria to significantly involve itself in military operations in Yemen. As the 
likelihood of the Syrian regime falling appeared increasingly slim, especially after Moscow’s large-
scale military and aerial intervention against the armed opposition in September 2015 in support 
of Damascus, Abu Dhabi gradually softened its official opposition to the Assad regime. Indeed, it 
went further by playing a role in freezing the military fronts in Daraa and Quneitra governorates 
and threatening to cease funding the Southern Front on several occasions in 2017 and 2018. Finally, 
through Khalid al-Mahamid, it pushed the armed opposition groups to negotiate a Russian-brokered 
‘local reconciliation agreement’ with the Syrian regime, which led to the rebels surrendering in July 
2018.29 
Following these major changes and political evolutions in the regional scene, Emirati officials 
justified their decision to resume relations with Damascus in 2018 with what they called the necessity 
of reactivating an Arab presence and role in Syria. The officially-stated purpose was to counter the 
deepening influence of Turkey and Iran in the country.30 A year earlier, the UAE Foreign Minister 
Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan had already urged Iran and Turkey to end what he called their 
“colonial” actions in Syria and their attempts to reduce the sovereignty of the Syrian state.31
Indeed, tensions over several regional political issues between the UAE and Turkey have steadily 
increased in recent years, especially after the Egyptian military coup in summer 2013. These issues 
include Turkey’s alignment with Qatar,32 competing political and economic interests in the Horn of 
Africa33 and the Libyan conflict, in which they support opposing actors. Turkish President Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan has even accused the UAE of supporting the 2016 coup attempt by a small contingent 
of the Turkish army.34 From the perspective of the UAE rulers, one of the main points of contention 
has been Turkey’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic fundamentalist movements 
28  The UAE took over Socotra after establishing a military base on the Yemeni island and carrying out extensive social 
and economic development. Socotra’s strategic location in the middle of one of the world’s most important oil trading 
routes enables the UAE to control trade through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait between Yemen and the 
Horn of Africa. Youssef Igrouane, “Is the UAE Gearing Up to Annex Yemen’s Socotra Island?” Inside Arabia, 26 April 
2019, https://bit.ly/2Vtnpi1 
29  Hiba Mohammad, “Syrian Opponents to ‘Al-Quds al-Arabi’” (in Arabic),  Al-Quds, 25 May 2018, https://bit.ly/2pXODiJ; 
Abdullah al-Jabassini, “From Rebel Rule to a Post-Capitulation Era in Daraa Southern Syria: The Impacts and Outcomes 
of Rebel Behaviour During Negotiations,” Research Project Report  (Florence: European University Institute, February 
2019),  https://bit.ly/2nnQ0q4
30  Hashem Osseiran, “UAE Reopens Embassy in Damascus after Six Years” The National, 27 December 2018, https://
bit.ly/2Nh5aYU. 
31  Emirates News Agency, ‘UAE Press: There is no Room for Colonialism in Today’s World,’ 31 August 2017, https://
bit.ly/2pRigCf 
32  In June 2017, among a list of 13 demands to Qatar the UAE actually demanded the removal of Turkey’s base in Doha 
as one of its conditions for lifting the blockade on Qatar, underscoring its opposition to Turkish influence and presence 
in the region.
33  In Somalia, a fight for control of ports and maritime routes has pitted Turkey and Qatar against Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE.
34  Samuel Ramani, “UAE Steps Up Anti-Turkey Efforts in Syria,” al-Monitor, 25 February 2019, https://bit.ly/31QCtpD 
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since 2011, which they perceive as a significant threat to their own rule and to regional stability. 
Since then, Abu Dhabi’s ambition has been to contain these efforts by Turkey. After Ankara expanded 
its sphere of influence in northern Syria and became one of the three leading international actors 
(along with Russia and Iran) in the so-called Astana diplomatic process, the Emirates condemned the 
Turkish-led Operation Olive Branch in Afrin in Syria in March 2018. The UAE’s opposition to Turkish 
influence in Syria has notably led the Emirates to express sympathy with the Syrian Kurds35 and in 
August 2018 to announce financial support worth 50 million USD for the US stabilisation programme 
in the SDF-controlled part of Raqqa governorate. In October 2019, the UAE Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs condemned the latest Turkish military offensive in northeast Syria, saying it represented “an 
unacceptable, flagrant assault on the sovereignty of a brotherly Arab state in defiance of international 
law and a blatant interference in Arab affairs.”36
As for Iran, the UAE has long been concerned by the threats it poses but has always sought to avoid a 
direct collision course when countering it. The UAE’s official position is that the Iranian programme 
to develop advanced ballistic missile capabilities must be curtailed.37 The UAE has therefore been a 
critical player in the US administration’s agenda putting ‘maximum pressure’ on Tehran. However, 
hostility between the UAE and Iran diminished in summer 2019. For the first time since 2013, in an 
apparent bid to calm tensions in the Gulf,38 maritime security talks between Tehran and Abu Dhabi 
were held; a memorandum of understanding to reinforce border security between the two countries 
was signed  in August 2019;39 and the Joint Emirati-Iranian Border Committee resumed its activities 
for the first time in six years. At the same time, the UAE announced a reduction of its military 
presence in Yemen, a step which was seen positively by Iranian officials.40 
The lack of political coherence in US foreign policy towards Iran41 and Washington’s reluctance to 
protect its Gulf allies have caused the Emirates to fear being isolated in a potential confrontation 
with Iran, pushing the UAE to pursue some form of direct understanding with Tehran. Moreover, 
its attempt to seek more stable relations with Iran was widely perceived in the region as a way for 
it to guard its reputation as a safe and dynamic business hub. Emirati officials feared any possible 
Iranian attempts to launch direct attacks on their territory could endanger their economic and political 
stability.42 Finally, concerns in Dubai, which has maintained close economic relations with Tehran, 
also tempered the UAE’s policy toward Iran, especially when compared with that of Saudi Arabia.43 
Appeals for de-escalation have not, however, modified the UAE’s official position towards Iranian 
intervention and influence in the regional arena. Iranian influence in Syria is perceived in Abu Dhabi 
35  Kosar Nawzad, “UAE Reiterates Support for Syria’s Kurds,” Kurdistan 24, 31 January 2019, https://bit.ly/2KFuhmh  
36  Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, “UAE Condemns Turkish Military Aggression in Syria,” 10 
October 2019, https://bit.ly/31ZmUfI  
37  Liz Sly, “The UAE’s Ambitions Backfire as It Finds Itself on the Front Line of US-Iran Tensions,” The Washington 
Post, 11 August 2019, https://wapo.st/2KLiCkC 
38  The de-escalation came after attacks on UAE tankers and other vessels off the UAE coast (near Fujairah, which handles 
70 percent of the UAE’s oil exports) in May and June 2019. Unlike Washington and Riyad, Abu Dhabi did not directly 
name Teheran as being responsible for limpet mines exploding on tankers off the UAE coast in June 2019.
39  Doha Institute, “Changes in UAE Policy: Reasons and Motivations,” 8 August 2019, https://bit.ly/2nqVyzD
40  Middle Eye, “Iranian press review: Gulf Tensions Bring Unlikely Friends Iran and UAE Closer,” 8 August 2019, 
https://bit.ly/2ZM8EFY 
41  Washington put an end to the 2015 nuclear deal and deepened sanctions against Iran while more recently calling for 
direct negotiations with Teheran and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to end the confrontation over the 2015 deal. 
42  Iranian forces could easily target UAE oil installations with short-range rockets. The attack on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil 
processing plant on 14 September 2019 strengthened fears of a possible attack against its infrastructure. On 18 September 
2019 Yemen’s Houthi group actually stated that it had identified dozens of sites in the UAE as possible targets. Reuters, 
“Yemen’s Houthis Threaten to Attack United Arab Emirates Targets,” 18 September 2019, https://reut.rs/2kFgr9v 
43  Giorgio Cafiero, “The UAE and Iran’s Maritime Talks,” Lobe Log, 6 August 2019,https://bit.ly/2GQjx1Y 
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as a negative element and an important challenge to its own future rapprochement with Syria. However, 
the ambitions of certain Gulf monarchies to distance Damascus from Tehran appear unrealistic, at 
least for the foreseeable future. While before the war Syria was able to balance its international 
relationships between the two networks by simultaneously maintaining close relationships with Iran 
and Russia, its two closest allies, and reviving a detente with Western states and Gulf monarchies, 
Iran has since then considerably increased its influence and presence in Syria. 
2. An Interest in Reinvesting in Syria Thwarted by Several Obstacles
Following several bilateral visits by UAE businessmen and officials to Syria, and by a Syrian 
delegation to the UAE in January 2019, an Emirati delegation attended the 61st session of the 
Damascus International Fair between 28 August and 6 September 2019. It comprised approximately 
40 persons, including members of the seven emirates’ Chambers of Commerce.44 On arriving in 
Damascus, Abdullah Sultan al-Owais, Chairman of the Sharjah Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
and Vice-President of the Federation of UAE Chambers of Commerce, stated that the presence of the 
UAE delegation at the event reflected a deep desire to push forward economic relations between the 
two countries.45 Some Emirati entrepreneurs and economic actors also stated that reconstruction in 
Syria represented a great opportunity for companies across the region, including in the Emirates.46 
For their part, officials in Damascus and Syrian businessmen close to the regime have welcomed 
the UAE’s official position of re-establishing relations with Syria because of the UAE’s investment 
potential.47 The Syrian regime is indeed in dire need of capital and investment, as its reserves have 
dwindled in recent years and the Syrian pound continues to depreciate, fluctuating at around 635 to 
the US dollar at the end of September 2019. 
Conference Gathering Syrian and Emirati Businessmen  
and Representatives of Economic Chambers
Source: Damascus Chamber of Industry
44  Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Sharjah and Umm al-Quwain.
45  Private Sector – Damascus International Fair 61 (in Arabic), Facebook, 28 August 2019, https://bit.ly/2Lb02mb
46  Ziad Awad, “Why 2019 and 2020 will be Great Vintage Years for Investing in the UAE and KSA,” Entrepreneur, 20 
August 2019, https://bit.ly/2lTeB5e 
47  Damascus Chamber of Industry (in Arabic), Facebook, 29 August 2019, https://bit.ly/2IrZSq8 
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2.1. Reinvest in the Same Sectors as Before 2011?
Before 2011, the UAE was Syria’s second-largest Arab investor, mostly in real estate and 
tourism complexes,48 with a total investment value of around 20 billion USD by 2011, although a 
single project accounted for three quarters of this amount. Nonetheless, the remainder amounted to 
around 5 billion USD, which helped rank the UAE as Syria’s largest source of FDI during the 2000s. 
In 2009, trade between the two countries reached 322 million USD, putting Syria in 58th position in 
terms of UAE non-oil trade with other countries, while more than a thousand Syrian companies were 
operating in the UAE in 2007.49 UAE investment in the Syrian banking sector was limited to Emirates 
Islamic Bank 10 percent stake in al-Baraka Bank Syria.50
Real Estate and Luxury Projects
Before 2011, the most important UAE investments and joint ventures in Syria were in large 
luxury real estate projects, such as UAE-based Majid Al Futtaim’s (MAF) 1 billion USD stake in the 
Khams Shamat tourism development in Damascus51 and a 15 billion USD plan to build Bonyan City, 
a tourism and real estate project in the countryside near Damascus.52 In addition, the Eighth Gate 
project, which included the new Damascus Stock Exchange and other commercial, retail and leisure 
spaces, was led by Emaar-IGO, a joint venture between Emaar Syria and Dubai-based Investment 
Group Overseas (IGO). It was valued at between 500 million and 1 billion USD.53 Emaar also owned 
the Damascus Hills project, which established the Damascus IT digital city and included a range of 
villas and apartments, offices and commercial centres worth half a billion USD. Moreover, the Emirati 
contractor company Arabtec Construction won a 67 million USD contract in February 2010 to build 
the Yasmeen Rotana Hotel in Damascus.54 However, most of these projects were not completed by 
2011 and were interrupted by the beginning of the uprising in mid- March 2011.55
Perhaps unsurprisingly, since mid-2018 the UAE has shown interest in new luxury real estate 
opportunities in Syria, especially the well-known Marota City project in Damascus.56 In August 2018, 
UAE citizen Abdul Jalil al-Blooki, deputy chairman of Aafaq Islamic Finance, a Sharia-compliant 
financial services firm, and head of the Syrian Emirates Private Development and Investment 
Company LLC, visited the premises of Damascus Cham Holding and expressed interest in investing 
in the Marota City development.57 A few months later in January 2019, a Damascus Cham Holding 
delegation, represented by its former Chief Executive Nassouh Nabulsi, visited the UAE with other 
48  Al-Bayan, “Chairman of the Investment Authority to ‘al-Bayan’: The Emirates is the Second Arab Country in the Size 
of Investments in Syria” (in Arabic), 23 January 2010, https://bit.ly/31K993S 
49  Al-Ittihad, “335 million dirhams, Volume of Trade Exchange between the UAE and Syria” (in Arabic), 26 December 
2010, https://bit.ly/2Zesc8R 
50  The Syria Report, “UAE Companies Showing Growing Interest in Syria,” 24 December 2018, https://bit.ly/31LNJ6H 
51  Elizabeth Broomhall, “MAF Committed to Syria despite Violent Unrest,” Arabian Business, 26 April 2012, 
https://bit.ly/33TCR8K 
52  This project was led by the UAE Bonyan International Investment Group to build a new city in the  Jabal al-Shaykh area 
near the city of Qatana. Argaam, “Special Report: Monitoring the Most Important Gulf Investments in the Real Estate and 
Tourism Sectors in Syria” (in Arabic), 21 December 2011, https://bit.ly/30hbljl 
53  Emaar, “Emaar-IGO Launches Sale of Eighth Gate Commercial Centre in Dubai on Feb. 23,” 19 February 2009, 
https://bit.ly/2zdUMbP 
54  Angela Giuffrida, “Investors on Road to Damascus,” The National, 1 May 2010, https://bit.ly/31LR85o 
55  Ziad Ghosn, “Syria: Gulf Investments in the Protection of the State” (in Arabic), al-Akhbar, 27 July 2016, 
https://bit.ly/2VvSUWy
56  Mahmoud Al-Lababidi, “Damascus Businessmen: the Phantoms of Marota City,” Research Project Report, (Florence: 
European University Institute, April 2019), https://bit.ly/2lHjVbm 
57  Mahmoud Saleh, “In a New Step UAE Announces its Willingness to Invest in Syria” (in Arabic), al-Watan online, 7 
August 2018, https://bit.ly/2Oxj75t
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Syrian delegates to encourage investment and partnerships in Syria in various sectors of the economy, 
including real estate. The delegation met a number of UAE Chambers of Commerce and Industry, in 
addition to local businessmen.58  
In December 2018, another UAE-based company, Damac Properties, one of the largest real estate 
developers in the UAE and the wider Arab world, 59 also sent a delegation to Damascus to meet 
representatives of two Syrian companies, Telsa Group and al-Diyar al-Dimashqiah.60 The owner 
of the latter is Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali, a former minister of communication and  a minority 
shareholder who sits on the board of Syriatel, owned by Rami Makhlouf. More broadly, UAE real 
estate development companies, such as Reportage Properties, Rotana, Arabtec and Horizon Energy 
LLC, were well-represented at the 2019 Damascus International Fair. 
Moreover, in July 2018 the Syrian Ministry of Tourism granted a licence for the management of 
a boutique hotel in central Damascus to a UAE company, Coral Hotels, and its local partner Julia 
Dumna. The investors were expected to invest 750 million SYP, equivalent to around USD 1.7 
million, to refurbish the four-star hotel.61 
However, to date, none of these visits and statements have yet been translated into any real investments 
or formal steps towards them. Perhaps just one month after the Damascus Fair is still too early for 
investment. However, significant obstacles could also prevent a quick return of UAE investors (on 
which more below).  
Transport and Trade
In 2017, the UAE constituted the seventh or eighth largest market for Syrian exporters, 
representing 44.5 million USD. The main products imported were: animal and vegetable fats and oils 
(6.5 million USD); articles in stone, plaster, asbestos, mica and similar materials (6.3 million USD); 
natural and cultured pearls, precious and semi-precious stones and precious metals (5.6 million USD); 
and coffee, tea, mate and spices (5.5 million USD). However, the balance of trade was clearly in 
favour of the UAE, as exports from the Emirates to Syria reached 968 million USD in the same year, 
including electrical machinery, equipment and parts (479 million USD); tobacco (280 million USD); 
machinery (64 million USD); and plastic (20.7 million USD).62 Emirati exports to Syria continued 
to increase in 2018, reaching 1.5 billion USD,63 although most of this growth was due to Chinese 
products transiting through Dubai being rebranded as made in the UAE in order to benefit from the 
advantages of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) deal. 
This explains why Emirati companies are indeed interested in resuming contacts with Syria regarding 
transport, trade and services, especially since Syria is a gateway to the Mediterranean Sea. At the 
beginning of January 2019 the UAE’s Dubai Ports (DP) World, one of the largest port operators in 
58  Emmar Syria, “Marota City Arrives in Abu Dhabi Next Week” (in Arabic), 15 January 2019, https://bit.ly/2L4AdEf 
59  Damac Properties has assets of more than USD 7 billion and an annual revenue of more than USD 2 billion. UAE 
businessman Husain Ali Habib Sajwani holds a 72.2 percent stake in the company. The company has subsidiaries in Qatar 
and Saudi Arabia, with projects in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. Adam Hanieh, Money, Markets, and Monarchies. 
The Gulf Cooperation Council and the Political Economy of the Contemporary Middle East, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018), 84.
60  Emmar Syria “In Damascus DAMAC Properties Discusses Ways to Implement Real Estate Development Projects” (in 
Arabic), 20 December 2018, https://bit.ly/2Hg3zyC
61  The Syria Report, “Tourism Ministry Grants Hotel Management License to UAE Company,” 3 July 2018, 
https://bit.ly/2TN3NlD 
62  The Syria Report, “Exporters Federation to Set-up UAE-dedicated Freight Company despite Obstacles in Bilateral 
Relationship,” 27 February 2019, https://bit.ly/2HcLIZg 
63  UN Comtrade Data Base, 23 August 2019, https://comtrade.un.org 
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the world, announced the establishment of a 2,500km transport corridor from Jebel Ali in Dubai to 
the Nassib-Jaber border crossing between Jordan and Syria. The terminal operator stated that the new 
corridor would see close collaboration between customs authorities and logistics providers in the 
UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon to create a more efficient flow of goods to and from 
Syria. DP World declared that the first convoy of three Dubai-registered trucks made the journey 
in six days, a significant reduction from the average of 24 days it previously took to complete the 
journey before the border was reopened.64
In mid-February 2019, the chairman of the agricultural committee at the Syrian Exporters’ Federation, 
Iyad Mohammad, stated that procedures were under way to set up a shipping company and warehouses 
for Syrian exports to Dubai, as agreed during a visit by Syrian businessmen to the UAE in January 
2019.65 
However, these announcements are not turning into effective results. In fact, in April 2019 the Syrian 
Ministry of Transport cancelled exemptions that benefitted Saudi and Emirati trucks crossing into 
Syria under bilateral agreements signed respectively in 2004 and 2005, dealing an additional blow to 
efforts to restore ties with the Gulf monarchies.66 At the same time, despite UAE officials declaring they 
were envisaging resuming flights to Syria,67 Emirates airline flights to Damascus remain suspended,68 
although before the war Emirates had been the largest air travel operator to Syria.69 Restrictions on 
Syrian airspace have indeed yet to be lifted. For its part, Abu Dhabi-based Etihad Airways has no 
immediate plans to resume flights to Damascus.70 Political, rather than technical, factors will be likely 
to weigh most heavily in decisions by these airlines and others in the region. Since July 2018, the 
Syrian Cham Wings Airlines, which is under US sanctions, has been the only airline operating flights 
from Damascus to the UAE.
2.2. Obstacles to Emirati Reinvestment in Syria 
Despite official visits and potential investment opportunities in the above-mentioned sectors, 
no concrete steps have yet been taken. Alongside the high level of insecurity, corruption and a lack 
of security guarantees and of a legal framework for potential investments, two other key factors are 
likely to deter Emirati investment in Syria: US sanctions and economic difficulties in Dubai.   
US Sanctions
The long reach of US sanctions is unquestionably a major concern for the UAE and other Gulf 
monarchies seeking to exert their influence in Syria. More generally, US pressure has put the brakes 
on further political rapprochement between certain Arab regimes (notably Saudi Arabia) and Syria.
64  Logistics Middle East, “DP World Establishes Trade Corridor between Jebel Ali and Syria,” 3 January 2019, 
https://bit.ly/2z52eWW 
65  SANA, “Exports Unions Works on Establishing Warehouses for Syrian Exports in UAE,” 19 February 2019, 
https://bit.ly/2KJPFad 
66  The Syria Report, “Syrian Decisions Signal Failure of Efforts at Resuming Ties with Gulf,” 17 April 2019, 
https://bit.ly/2ZerWqp 
67  Airlines from the Gulf and other countries suspended their flights in 2011 and 2012 because of the security situation 
in Syria, poor economic returns and political pressures, although there are no specific western sanctions forbidding any 
company from flying over or to Syria. Only three international civilian airlines (Iraqi Airways, Middle East Airlines 
(Lebanon) and Qatar Airways) operate today. 
68  Emirates, “Flights to Damascus,” 19 August 2019, https://bit.ly/2NaujV0 
69  Up to 2010 UAE national carriers operated 13 flights a day to various Syrian cities, including seven flights to Damascus 
International Airport. Blog Al-Jazeera Arabic, “Study: The Role of the UAE in the Syrian Issue File” (in Arabic), 14 April 
2015, https://bit.ly/2Mn1mFT 
70  Deena Kamel, “Flydubai Mulls Resuming Syria Flights as UAE Regulator Studies Damascus Airport Safety,” The 
National, 17 January 2019, https://bit.ly/2NfDfZi 
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The UAE cannot risk endangering relations with its major patron and ally, the US. The country hosts 
approximately 5,000 US military personnel under a bilateral defence cooperation agreement. It is 
also an important buyer of US military equipment, including sophisticated missile defences.71 The 
UAE is the United States’ largest single export market in the Middle East, receiving more than 19.5 
billion USD in exports in 2018 – the tenth year in a row that it has held this distinction. Emirati FDI 
in the US reached 26.3 billion USD in 2016, while US FDI in the UAE amounted to 13 billion USD. 
Additionally, the UAE pegs its currency, the dirham, to the dollar, and more than 1,500 US companies 
have a presence in the UAE.72  
According to many experts, the prospects for Emirati investment in Syria still remain very uncertain 
as long as the US administration applies pressure to keep it that way.73 Indeed, in September 2018 
two UAE-based companies, International Pipeline Construction FZE74 and Sonex Investments Ltd,75 
fell under US sanctions for supplying weapons and fuel to the Syrian regime.76 In July 2019, the UAE 
Minister of Culture cancelled funding of up to 25 million USD earmarked for the restoration of some 
parts of the old souks in Aleppo city77 because the project included several government schools and 
properties owned by the Ministry of Religious Endowments, which could have been targeted by US 
sanctions.78 
Nevertheless, the UAE participation in the 2019 Damascus International Fair came in spite of a US 
statement days before the exhibition reiterating a “warning that anyone doing business with the Assad 
regime or its associates is exposing themselves to the possibility of US sanctions.”79 Despite its desire 
not to jeopardise its alliance with Washington, the UAE has sought to diversify its partnerships and 
political collaborations with various international actors, notably strengthening its political, military 
and economic relations with Russia and China, two key US rivals. These moves could help it gain 
greater autonomy vis-à-vis Washington and thereby serve its interests. 
Economic Crisis in Dubai
Another factor limiting the prospects for an active Emirati economic role in Syria is the 
economic difficulty facing the country, especially the emirate of Dubai. In 2018, Dubai’s economy 
grew just 1.9 percent, the slowest since the 2009 financial crisis, as it suffered from a downturn in its 
real estate market. Property experts believe Dubai house prices will continue to decline sharply in 
2019 and 2020 as a result of a slowdown in the wider economy and an over-supply of housing units.80 
71  Congressional Research Service, “The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy,” 16 August 2019, 2, 
https://bit.ly/2JYR0r9
72  Embassy of the UAE in Washington, “UAE-US Economic Relationship,” 18 August 2019, https://bit.ly/2KRROzi 
73  Email interview with Jean Louis Samaan, associate professor in strategic studies currently attached to the UAE National 
Defense College, 8 August 2019; Email interview with Samir Seifan, Syrian economist, 26 August 2019.
74  The company was designated for being owned or controlled by Hesco Engineering, owned by George Haswani, one 
of the Syrian regime’s middlemen for dealings between the regime and Islamic State, and allegedly facilitating payments 
originating in Syria.
75  The company operated as a buyer, consignee or charterer for shipments of crude oil and petroleum products discharged 
at Baniyas, including 90,000 metric tons of fuel oil delivered in May 2017 and another shipment of over 43,000 metric 
tons of crude oil in November 2017.
76  Joyce Karam, “US Sanctions Syrian and Lebanese Nationals Supporting Assad,” The National, 7 September 2018, 
https://bit.ly/33MEK6T 
77  The project was to reconstruct a 2 km street from the al-Atarin souk to Bab Qnisrin. It was planned to be implemented 
by the Agha Khan Foundation, whose officials did not confirm or deny this information when asked by the researcher. 
Telephone interview with an Aleppo industrialist, 17 July 2019.
78  Telephone interview with an Aleppo industrialist, 17 July 2019.
79  Arab News, “US Warns Businesses Against Taking Part in Damascus Fair,” 28 August 2019, https://bit.ly/2ZorMxQ 
80  Manzer Hussain and Shrutee Sarkar, “Dubai House Prices to Fall Sharply: Reuters Poll,” Reuters, 5 September 2019, 
https://reut.rs/2kxKWxN 
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In addition, Dubai has also suffered from the implementation of US sanctions against Iran following 
President Trump’s arrival in power. In 2017 and 2018, the UAE’s exports/re-exports to Iran totalled 
17 and 19 billion USD respectively, with most of the trade taking place via Dubai. Emirati authorities 
project trade with Iran will plummet to half this year as a result of US sanctions, while the number of 
Iranians living in the UAE has fallen from 117,000 three years ago to 73,000 today. 81 
More generally, according to a Central Bank report the non-oil sectors in the UAE “advanced at a 
softer pace in growing by 1.3 percent in 2018 compared to a growth of 1.9 percent in the previous 
year.” Since 2014, real estate prices in Dubai and Abu Dhabi have fallen by 16.5 percent82 and 16.6 
percent respectively. 
The economic difficulties faced by the UAE, and more particularly by Dubai, could represent an 
obstacle to potential future investments in Syria in the form of a slowdown of activities by UAE-
based companies, especially in real estate. In addition to this, the Emirati measures to boost economic 
growth are mostly directed towards the internal economy, with a combination of fiscal stimulus 
packages and new investment laws in order to encourage FDI, increase consumption, reinvigorate the 
property market and improve the labour market,83 while the Dubai authorities are currently primarily 
focusing on preparing for Expo 2020, hoping to make it a significant success.   
3. Which Networks to Use for Emirati Investment in Syria? 
In the medium term, if the current obstacles were to be lifted or at least significantly reduced 
it would be important to analyse the kind of intermediaries and networks through which potential 
Emirati investors could reinvest in Syria. 
3.1. The Syrian Business Community in the UAE
For decades, the UAE, and Dubai in particular, has had a relatively important Syrian expatriate 
population. Before 2011, some of the UAE’s investments in Syria went through, or were made with 
the collaboration of, Syrian businessmen and networks based in the Emirates. A Syrian Business 
Council for the city of Dubai and the northern Emirates was established in 200384 and in Abu Dhabi 
in 2005 to promote economic ties and investments between the two countries. Moreover, since March 
2011 the UAE has extended residency permits to more than 100,000 Syrian nationals, including more 
than 6,000 investors and a large number of academics, professionals and entrepreneurs. The total 
number of Syrian nationals living in the UAE is now around 242,000. Syrians have been particularly 
involved in five main sectors in the UAE: education, construction, media, healthcare and tourism. 85
However, whether they have been there for decades or are newcomers after the outbreak of the 
revolution, it seems unlikely that the Syrian businessmen based in the Emirates will play an intermediate 
role in Emirati investment projects in Syria. Most of the figures who have accumulated significant 
amounts of capital outside Syria, mostly in the UAE, are today outside the business networks linked
81  Andrew England and Simeon Kerr, “US Sanctions Put Chill on Iranian Trade with UAE,” Financial Times, 26 July 
2019, https://on.ft.com/2ZcCljm  
82  Some analysts have stated that property prices in Dubai are down by at least 25 per cent since 2014. Simeon Kerr, 
“Dubai Fears the End of its ‘Build it and They Will Come’ Model,” Financial Times, 2 April 2019, https://bit.ly/2TOaVwN
83  Central Bank of the UAE, “Annual Report Central Bank of the UAE 2018,” 28-30, https://bit.ly/2lvsB5i
84  This council was composed of around 320 members before 2011. Al-Bayan, “The Syrian Business Council Elects its 
New Members in Dubai and the Northern Emirates” (in Arabic), 7 May 2007, https://bit.ly/2kd3uU4 
85  Embassy of the UAE, Washington DC, “Syrian Refugee Crisis – UAE Contribution,” 19 August 2019, https://bit.
ly/2P2Rcwc  
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to Damascus. Moreover, many Syrian businessmen located in the UAE and involved in opposition 
circles have seen their property confiscated by the Damascus authorities. Instead, they have been 
investing in the UAE, in sectors ranging from trade and real estate to services.
This has been the case for important businessmen based in the UAE for decades, some of whom 
returned to Syria in the years following the arrival in power of Bashar al-Assad and the liberalisation 
of the economy in the 2000s, while the great majority made investments and funded projects while 
remaining in the UAE. For example, Muaffaq al-Gaddah built his wealth in the UAE and started 
investing in Syria in the mid-2000s as the economy opened up. Notably, before 2010 he invested 
in several real estate projects in Damascus with the IGO company and in joint ventures with Emaar 
to implement the Eighth Gate project, and he was provided with government land in Damascus for 
free in a securities exchange. However, the Syrian government seized his assets in 2014 under the 
accusation that he was “funding terrorist organisations” and “participating in bringing weapons into 
Daraa.”86 Despite his name having been removed from the Syrian government’s terrorist list in May 
2018, in February 2019 he dissolved his Syrian real estate development company, MAG Real Estate 
Development.87
Some other Syrian businessmen located in the UAE for decades involved in Syrian opposition circles 
(politically, economically or through the provision of humanitarian services) also saw their property 
confiscated by the regime in November 2012, with the same accusation of financing what it called 
“armed terrorist groups.”88 Such is the case of Dr. Abdul Qader al-Sankari, a former president of 
the Syrian Business Council of Dubai and the Northern Emirates and chairman of the Paris Gallery 
company, created in 1983 in the Emirates, which is now a leading luxury retailer in the Middle 
East.89 In December 2015 he participated in a Syrian opposition meeting in Riyadh gathering around 
100 personalities, although without joining any opposition groups or pursuing any public political 
activities.90 Another example is Mohamad Rahif Hakmi, former vice president of the Syrian Business 
Council of Dubai and chairman of the Armada Group, which was established in 1971 in the UAE 
and today holds a multi-billion-dollar portfolio in the healthcare, wellness and spa, real estate 
development, contracting and facilities management and hospitality sectors.91 Khaled al-Mahamid, 
a Syrian doctor and businessman with interests ranging from real estate to foodstuffs, transferred 
his economic activities, which were initially based in Greece and Cyprus, to the UAE in 2000. First 
a member of the opposition’s Cairo platform, he left it to join the High Negotiations Committee as 
an independent member, before becoming its vice president until his resignation in October 2018. 
These three personalities were involved in the Syrian Business Council for Relief and Development, 
which was initially connected to the Syrian National Council and established at the beginning of 
2012 to fund various humanitarian activities in opposition-held areas and among Syrian refugees in 
neighbouring countries.92 The organisation  gradually disappeared as the opposition-held areas shrank 
and as businessmen acted increasingly separately in the provision of humanitarian services. 
Another important Syrian business figure based in the UAE was Waleed al-Zo’bi, former Minister of 
Infrastructure and Agriculture in the Syrian Interim Government at the end of 2013, who developed 
86  The Syrian Observer “How Assad Junior Lost the Empire,” 23 December 2013, https://bit.ly/2KPabGk  
87  The Syria Report, “Exporters Federation to Set-up UAE-Dedicated Freight Company Despite Obstacles in Bilateral 
Relationship,” 27 February 2019, https://bit.ly/2HcLIZg 
88  Yalla Souria, “Syrian Revolution News Round-up Day 600: Saturday, 3 November 2012,” 4 November 2012, https://
bit.ly/2QTIFfH 
89  Paris Gallery, “Home,” 9 October 2019, https://bit.ly/2IAB2ob 
90  Al-Souria Net, “The Opposition Agrees on Several Points on the First Day of the Riyadh Conference” (in Arabic), 9 
December 2015, https://bit.ly/33ijghm
91  Mohammed Rahif Hakmi Website, “Biography,” 12 September 2019, https://bit.ly/35bvM44 
92  Michael Peel, “Syria Opposition Taps Business Class,” Financial Times, 19 March 2019, https://on.ft.com/2otyZLJ 
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his business in the UAE in the late 1970s, initially in real estate projects. Waleed al-Zo’bi is today 
the owner of Tiger group, a company with 7,000 employees and interests in real estate, education, 
healthcare, trading and other industries in the UAE and other countries in the Middle East.93 
The Syrian businessmen newly established in the UAE after 2011 have lost all their economic ties 
inside Syria. Imad Ghreiwati, who headed the Federation of Chambers of Industry between 2006 
and 2011, travelled to Dubai in 2012. In 2017, the Assad regime seized the assets of a number of 
members of the Ghreiwati family, including Imad and four of his siblings.94 Firas Mustafa Tlass, a 
Syrian business tycoon who started funding Syrian opposition groups from the UAE,95 transferred his 
economic activities to Dubai after his company, MAS, was formally transferred to state ownership 
in August 2014 as a punishment by the regime. In 2017, he was arrested by Emirati security forces 
for working as a broker between IS and the giant cement group Lafarge Holcim, including for the 
purchase of oil and toxic gas.
UAE-based Syrian business figures who were involved in opposition circles have progressively 
stopped any public display or actions of dissent against the Damascus regime. In addition to the 
transformation of the revolution into a war and the slim prospects of Assad’s downfall, among the 
reasons for ending their opposition activities was the probability of the UAE authorities putting 
pressure against them. For example, businessman Waleed al-Zo’bi now concentrates solely on his 
business activities.96 In January 2018, his Tiger group announced investments of 10 billion AED (2.7 
billion USD) to develop residential and hospitality projects in the UAE by 2020 and build a city with 
100 towers in the emirate of Ajman.97 For his part, Mohamad Rahif Hakmi has also considerably toned 
down his opposition to the Syrian regime98 and focused on his business activities, which continued to 
expand in 2019, notably with the purchase of BNP Paris’s subsidiary bank in the Comoro Islands and 
a five-star luxury hotel in Ankara, Turkey.99 
The Syrian business diaspora in the UAE has no prospect of returning, at least in the short term. Its 
potential to play an intermediate role in Emirati investments in Syria is fraught with difficulties and 
obstacles as the regime’s own business networks have consolidated their influence and grip on the 
country’s economy. 
3.2. Economic Opportunities in Syria Through Damascus Networks   
Foreign investment opportunities in Syria are linked to the nature and evolutions of the Syrian 
regime. Before the war, Syria’s significant business networks were characterised by a form of crony 
capitalism in which economic opportunities were dependent on loyalty and connections to the regime. 
These trends have been considerably reinforced in the past few years as large numbers of wealth-
holders left the country and a new elite emerged. Crony capitalists and members of the new business 
elite have been able to capture the economic opportunities left in gaps created by Syrian businessmen 
departing abroad. 
93  Tiger Group, “About us,” 12 September 2019, https://bit.ly/2lQSnQW; The Syrian Observer, ‘Who’s who: The Interim 
Government Ministers,’ 3 December 2013, https://bit.ly/2khfDHF 
94  Zaman al-Wasl, “Assad Regime Confiscates Ghreiwati Family Assets,” Syrian Observer, 13 October 2018, https://bit.
ly/2Xn1Tsu 
95  Firas Tlass is the brother of Manaf Tlass, a former Brigadier General in the Syrian Republican Guard and member of 
Bashar al-Assad’s inner circle until 2012 who left Syria after voicing his opposition to the regime.
96  Eqtisad, “Where is Disappeared Businessman Supporting the Revolution Waleed al-Zo’bi?” (in Arabic), 2 February 
2019, https://bit.ly/2lGF9Xc 
97  Waheed Abbas, “Tiger Group to Invest Dh10b in UAE by 2020,” Khaleej Times, 12 January 2018, https://bit.ly/2mitT3u 
98  Dr. Rahif Hakmi, Facebook, 9 October 2019, https://bit.ly/31WznRi 
99  Armada Group, Facebook, 9 October 2019, https://bit.ly/30W9uji 
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Indeed, the Syrian government’s economic policies and reconstruction schemes have the objective of 
consolidating the regime’s political and economic power, especially through networks of businessmen 
linked to it.100 This is clearly illustrated by the personalities selected by Damascus to meet the UAE’s 
representatives and economic actors. The Syrian delegation to the UAE in January 2019, for example, 
was headed by Muhammad Hamsho, a frontman for Maher al-Assad and secretary general of the 
Federation of Chambers of Commerce. It was composed of numerous businessmen closely linked to 
the Syrian regime such as Wassim Qattan,101 Fares Shehabi102 and Samer Debs.103 This delegation did 
not meet Syrian businessmen residing in the Emirates, demonstrating that any possible investments 
in Syria should go through Damascus-connected business networks, which are mostly based in the 
country. Similarly, in their latest visit to Syria during the Damascus International Fair, the UAE 
delegation was welcomed by these same personalities. The forum, which gathered representatives 
of the Syrian private sector and Emirati visitors, focused on discussing the most important 
investment opportunities and incentives available to investors on both sides in various sectors, such 
as manufacturing, industry, services, alternative energy and power stations, agro-industry, tourism, 
trade and construction.104 These various meetings demonstrated the crucial role of these actors in any 
possible future UAE investments in Syria, especially as these crony-capitalists increased their wealth 
and power during the war. 
Another possible avenue for UAE investments to explore is Abu Dhabi’s deepening ties with Moscow. 
In June 2018, the UAE and Russia signed a Declaration of Strategic Partnership to strengthen dialogue 
between the two countries on bilateral, regional and international issues of common political concern. 
In the Syrian case, the UAE’s current position shares more common ground with Russia’s than any 
other Gulf monarchy’s except Oman by accepting Bashar al-Assad as the legitimate ruler of post-
war Syria. Similarly, both Moscow and Abu Dhabi vehemently oppose Islamic fundamentalist and 
jihadist groups both in Syria and elsewhere.
With its dominant position in Syria, Russia could facilitate Emirati investment in the country, 
especially as Moscow has been demanding that regional and other states participate financially in the 
reconstruction of Syria, encourage the return of refugees and reconnect Syria to the global financial 
markets. Moscow could also use Emirati and more generally Gulf investments in Syria to increase its 
leverage with Iran, boosting its own power and influence.
100  Daher, “The Political Economic Context of Syria’s Reconstruction”
101  Wassim Qattan is a businessman close to Maher al-Assad and has been the president of the Damascus Province 
Chamber of Commerce since February 2018. In the past few years he has also won several contracts for the management 
of large malls in Damascus.    
102  Fares Shehabi, head of the Aleppo Chamber of Industry and a known supporter of the regime, was elected President of 
the Federation of Syrian Chambers of Industry in June 2012 and became a member of parliament in 2016. 
103  Samer al-Debs, a manufacturer close to the regime and vice president of the Federation of Syrian Chambers of Industry, 
became a member of Parliament in 2012 and then president of the Damascus and Countryside Industrial Chamber in 2014.
104  Damascus Chamber of Industry, Facebook, 29 August 2019, https://bit.ly/2L2mK1a 
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Conclusion
Since the beginning of the Arab uprisings at the end of 2010, the UAE has played an active and 
growing role in the region, politically, economically and militarily, while consolidating its status as a 
regional financial centre and international business hub. Following the beginning of the Yemen war 
in March 2015 and Russia’s intervention in Syria at the end of September the same year, the UAE 
progressively adopted a new approach towards Syria, eventually abandoning its previous official 
opposition to Damascus. Syria no longer topped the UAE’s list of political priorities. The UAE also 
began reconsidering its aggressive foreign policy due to its lack of successes, its significant costs (in 
billions of US dollars) and the instability it produced for the country’s economy.
The UAE’s rulers have pursued new official relations with Damascus in order to seek a political role 
in a future Syria through various means, including economic investment in (re-)construction plans. 
However, these prospects have been stalled as the US has tightened sanctions on Syria and pressured 
the UAE and other Gulf monarchies to halt their rapprochement with Syria, as they are unwilling to 
jeopardise their relations with Washington. 
At the same time, the UAE’s economy is facing difficulties of its own, while the emirate of Dubai is 
preoccupied with its preparations for Expo 2020. These factors have discouraged potential Emirati 
investments in Syria in the short term, while the capacities of Syrian businessmen based in the UAE 
or elsewhere to act as intermediaries for UAE investors became severely limited as the patrimonial 
nature of the Syrian regime was strengthened. UAE investments in Syria, especially in reconstruction 
schemes, have so far gone no further than being announced and are therefore not expected to 
materialise soon, while Syria’s political and economic isolation remains. 
These limitations and obstacles make the prospect of Emirati investors returning to Syria soon 
relatively remote. However, in recent years the UAE has been able to gain some autonomy allowing 
more space for independent political decisions and foreign policy choices, notably through its 
deepening relationships with Washington’s rivals, China and Russia. These changes have also taken 
place during a period of relative decline in US power at the global level, following its failed invasion 
and occupation of Iraq, the global economic and financial crises of 2007 and 2008 and the surge in 
regional uprisings since 2011.
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